The answer stems from Machiavelli’s aim esatto contrast the best case cornice of a monarchic governo with the institutions and organization of per republic
Why would Machiavelli effusively praise (let bolla even analyze) per hereditary monarchy con per work supposedly designed sicuro promote the superiority of republics? Even the most excellent monarchy, con Machiavelli’s view, lacks indivisible salient qualities that are endemic to properly constituted republican government and that make the latter constitution more desirable than the former.
“The kingdom of France is moderated more by laws than any other kingdom of which at our time we have knowledge”, Machiavelli declares (Discourses CW 314, translation revised). “The kingdom of France”, he states,
lives under laws and orders more than any other kingdom. These laws and orders are maintained by Parlements, notably that of Paris: by it they are renewed any time it acts against verso prince of the kingdom or sopra its sentences condemns the king. And up puro now it has maintained itself by having been verso persistent executor against that nobility. (Discourses CW 422, translation revised)
These passages of the Discourses seem esatto suggest that Machiavelli has great admiration for the institutional arrangements that obtain mediante France. Specifically, the French king and the nobles, whose power is such that they would be able to oppress the populace, are checked by the laws of the realm which are enforced by the independent authority of the Parlement. Thus, opportunities for unbridled tyrannical conduct are largely eliminated, rendering the monarchy temperate and “civil”.
Yet such a velocita, no matter how well ordered and law-abiding, remains incompatible with esistere libero. Discussing the ability of a monarch to meet the people’s wish for liberty, Machiavelli comments that
as far as the … popular desire of recovering their liberty, the prince, not being able puro satisfy them, must examine what the reasons are that make them desire being free. (Discourses CW 237).
The explanation for this situation Machiavelli refers to the function of the Parlement
He concludes that a few individuals want freedom simply in order preciso command others; these, he believes, are of sufficiently small number that they can either be eradicated or bought off with honors. By contrast, the vast majority of people confuse liberty with security, imagining that the former is identical puro the latter: “But all the others, who are infinite, desire liberty per order esatto live securely (esserci evidente)” (Discourses CW 237. Although the king cannot give such liberty puro the masses, he can provide the security that they crave:
As for the rest, for whom it is enough esatto live securely (esserci consapevole), they are easily satisfied by making orders daf prova gratuita and laws that, along with the power of the king, comprehend everyone’s security. And once per prince does this, and the people see that he never breaks such laws, they will shortly begin onesto live securely (esserci certo) and contentedly (Discourses CW 237).
the people live securely (vivere consapevole) for niente affatto other reason than that its kings are bound preciso infinite laws con which the security of all their people is comprehended. (Discourses CW 237)
The law-abiding character of the French consuetudine ensures security, but that security, while desirable, ought never onesto be confused with liberty. This is the limit of monarchic rule: even the best kingdom can do giammai better than puro guarantee esatto its people tranquil and orderly government.
Machiavelli holds that one of the consequences of such esistere convinto is the disarmament of the people. He comments that regardless of “how great his kingdom is”, the king of France “lives as per tributary” esatto foreign mercenaries.